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With the political changes in South Africa in the early 1990s, the South African government 
introduced a reform process in the entire water sector with the goal of a more enhanced and equitable 
water management system. This paper analyzes existing water allocation situations and applies a non-
linear optimization model to investigate the optimal intra- and inter-regional allocations in the Middle 
Olifants sub-basin of South Africa. Results show higher benefit from inter-regional water allocation. 
Reducing water supply levels to conform to the sustainable water supply policy, it can be shown that 
although water supply is reduced by approximately 50%, total benefits from water are only reduced by 
5% and 11% for inter- and intra-regional allocation regimes respectively. These results indicate that 








Water is one of the most indispensable of all natural resources; it is essential for human beings, 
economic development and biological diversity. However, many countries have to face the challenge of 
rapidly growing water demands, driven by an increased population and economic growth, linked to 
urbanization, industrialization and mechanization (King, 2004). The resulting water scarcity is one of the 
most pervasive natural resources allocation problems faced by development planners. Hence, water 
resources management turned out to be a political, social and economic issue of the present century and 
economists face new challenges of growing societal demands for water and changing laws and 
institutions (Louw, 2002). Nevertheless, it is also recognized that water scarcity not only results from 
quantitative or qualitative scarcity, but also from inefficient use and poor water management (Dinar, 
2003). Therefore, the need for efficient, equitable and sustainable water allocation policies has increased 
and new water management studies aim at investigating innovative strategies to yield more efficient 
water allocation (Rosegrant et al., 2000, Ringler, 2001). 
South Africa is one of the numerous countries in the world experiencing water shortages. The 
increasing competition between water users, decreased water supply and the high and the ever 
mounting demand for fresh water are some of the major problems of the country (Hassan and Crafford, 
2006). Consequently, current water uses are exceeding sustainable natural availability as groundwater is 
being mined, causing the need for new demand management strategies (Conradie, 2002). Hence, the 
South African government introduced the National Water Act (NWA) promoting an integrated and 
decentralized water resources management, emphasizing economic efficiency, environmental protection, 
equity and the empowerment of people (Hassan and Crafford, 2006). This requires better knowledge by 
water managers and policymakers on the economic value of water in various uses as well as powerful 
information systems that integrate hydrological, economic and social dimensions of water supply and 
demand in the framework of an Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) (McKinney et al., 
1999). There has been a growing national interest and recognition of the role that market-based 
approaches can play in facilitating and improving water demand management and water allocation 
(Howe et al., 1986). However, there are some pre-requisites which are necessary for proper market 
functioning. These include information and knowledge on water-use efficiencies and water values in its 
different uses, price elasticities of water demand, as well as necessary institutional and political settings. 
Nevertheless, information in this regard hardly exists to achieve such a sustainable and efficient water 
use management in the country. Institutions are usually lagging far behind the need for more 
appropriate policies and analytical tools are missing to provide water resources management agencies 
with guidelines to introduce an economically sensible water management (Louw, 2002). 
The paper is structured as follows. Section two presents the background, study area and 
objectives of the research. In section three, relevant literature is summarized and in section four, the 
conceptual framework outlining the basic structure of the model is illustrated. Section five elaborates on 
the demand coefficients and the final model structure. In section six, analysis of the main results, 
scenarios and policy simulations are presented, while section seven concludes. 2 
 
2. Background and Objectives 
2.1  National Water Act 
Basically two new laws, the Water Services Act and the National Water Act (NWA), which 
specifies the Government as the trustee of the nations’ water resources led to considerable 
transformations in the South African water sector (Nieuwoudt et al., 2003). The Water Services Act 
(1997) guarantees the right for a basic provision of drinking water and sewage services, which obliges all 
governmental levels to apply an efficient and sustainable provision of drinking water and sewage 
services (Republic of South Africa, 2002). The NWA provides the legislative framework of the 
management of water as a national resource and the possibility for a better integration of groundwater 
and surface water as well as a better water quality and quantity management. To fulfill the objectives of 
efficiency, equity and sustainability, it sets the following priorities in water allocation: 
i.  Provision of the 'National Reserve': ‘Ecological Reserve’ and ‘Human Reserve’ 
ii.  Meeting water needs for strategic purposes: ‘Strategic Reserve’ (e.g. power generation) 
iii.  Meeting the needs of general social and economic uses 
It, furthermore, acknowledges the possibility of temporary transfers of water entitlements and 
therefore creates the opportunity of water markets as allocation strategies. 
As the Act emphasizes a decentralized water management, Water Management Areas (WMAs) 
are established, which conduct the protection, use, development, conservation, management and control 
of water resources. Catchment Management Agencies (CMAs) are in the process of introduction in all 19 
WMAs to delegate water resource management planning to the regional or catchment level ensuring 
participation of local communities. For each WMA, the amount of water reserved for prioritized needs 
(Points I and ii) is determined by the National Department of Water Affairs (DWAF
1
The amount set aside for the ‘Human Reserve’ is essentially determined through the 
implementation of the national Free Basic Water (FBW) policy guaranteeing access to water for basic 
human needs (25 liters per capita and day) as water is formally recognized as a human right in the South 
African Constitution. This is in line with the global policy where, the United Nations just recently in July 
2010 declared water as a human right. However the member states did not agree on any binding 
numbers to be secured to people.  
).  
General social and economic uses constitute actual water demands of the various water users in 
South Africa such as industries, agriculture, services and households. As the water resources 
development potential has reached its limits in many WMAs, the issue of water demand management 
needs to be explored. According to Hassan and Farolfi (2005) water allocation decisions are currently 
made on the basis of limited information on water users´ behavior in different economic sectors. For an 
improved water demand management, the South African government has already implemented rather 
administrative approaches like water user registration and licensing. However, market-driven approaches 
with the aim of benefit maximization from water, which are based on the economic valuation of water, 
have not yet been applied. 
                                                   
1 It has been recently re-named as Department of Water Affairs (DWA). 3 
 
2.2  Study Area 
The Middle Olifants (MO) sub basin (Figure 2) lies in the Olifants basin in the North East of the 
country (Figure 1). Based on hydrological features, it is sub-divided into five tertiary catchments. The 
Olifants basin is the third most water-stressed basin in South Africa with wide variations in social and 
economic development, water availability and population density (DWAF, 2003). 
Figure 1  Water Management Areas in South Africa 
Figure 2  Tertiary Catchments of the MO 
 
The Middle Olifants sub-basin, with a size of 22,550 km
2, is home to 60% of the total Olifants 
basin population. It was selected as a study area due to the prevailing severe overuse of water resources 
and imbalanced water distribution. Water demands are already at their peak for consumption and 
production purposes. Table 1 shows that requirements are exceeding availabilities resulting in a water 
imbalance in the different sub-basins. This implies that too much groundwater is used leading to a 
lowering of the groundwater table and resulting in an unsustainable water use. 








 Upper Olifants  410  409  -1 
 Middle Olifants  395  301  -94 
 Steelport  95  61  -34 
 Lower Olifants  164  101  -63 
Source: DWAF (2004), modified 
The Middle Olifants has mainly a rural character with scattered formal and informal villages, 
with many of them located in the former homeland areas (DWAF, 2003), where households are still 
disadvantaged in terms of access to communal services, education and employment.  4 
 
With around 500 mm/year, rainfall is very low and over-abstraction of groundwater resources 
has already led to the lowering of groundwater levels in the whole study area. Main water users in the 
area comprise households, large-scale
2
The study area is characterized by a predominantly rural and historically disadvantaged 
population with limited access to water. On the other hand there are several large scale irrigation 
farmers who are mainly producing for the world market and who are using large amounts of water 
(Levite et al., 2002). In addition to that, growing industrial and agricultural activities driving economic 
development in the region have increasing water needs.  
 agriculture and the mining industry.  
In particular, this paper focuses on water use efficiency of the three principal competing water 
user sectors in the study area’s economy, namely irrigation, mining, and domestic
3 with the objective of 
maximizing total benefits from water use. Equity and sustainability issues as addressed by the NWA and 
its prioritization approach, limits water allocation to a sustainable amount, considering basic human and 
ecological needs
 4
The whole purpose of the modeling process is - based on a quantitative understanding of the 
water resources situation in the Middle Olifants - to improve water use efficiency through an optimal 
allocation of water in the context of the NWA. Currently, prices are missing or if they are set their 
enforcement is missing and they do not ensure an efficient water use in accordance to the requirements 
of the NWA implying the need for an improved water management. The outputs expected in the final 
model are the efficient use of water among the five tertiary catchments in the Middle Olifants sub-basin 
and the three economic sectors therein. Results will provide support for future water management and 
decision making alternatives regarding water allocation exploring several scenarios applicable to future 
circumstances pertaining South Africa. 
. 
                                                   
2 Large-scale agriculture refers to farmers that are producing for commercial purposes and sell their products 
mainly to the market. 
3 In the following the domestic sector will always refer to urban households. 
4 Water for ecological requirements and basic human needs are treated as constant and are subtracted from total 
water availability in the modeling framework. 5 
 
3. Literature Review  
Due to the deteriorating water scarcity situation and the subsequent water allocation problems, 
water management has seen a paradigm shift from supply management (mainly through the increase of 
water availability via water supply infrastructure and other technical solutions) to demand management 
(through improved technologies, incentives, re-design of tariffs). Several studies have dealt with optimal 
water allocations in different regions of the world. They differ in the type of data used, applied methods 
and biophysical factors included
5
Booker and Young (1994) developed a river optimisation model for the Colorado River to identify 
optimal inter-regional allocations and prices. They find increasing benefits, which are generated by water 
use, of up to 50% through market transfers.  
.  
Rosegrant et al. (2000) developed an integrated economic hydrologic model for the Maipo River 
Basin in Chile that not only considers water allocation but also takes into account interactions of water 
allocation and agricultural productivity, non agricultural water demand and resource degradation. 
Consequently the model estimates economic as well as social gains from efficiency improvements of 
water use. The model consists of nodes and links, representing physical entities and links between these 
entities. Water Sources and inflows and water demands are modelled including agricultural, municipal 
and industrial water demand. With the objective of maximising benefits from water use water demand 
and supply are integrated into an endogenous system determining efficient water allocations. Model 
results show that reallocations to higher water values yield higher benefits from water use, which is 
driven by differences in the marginal unit values of water. The model can be further improved by 
including further inputs to agricultural productions and using empirically estimated data on household 
and industrial water demand rather than using literature based elasticities.  
Louw (2002) developed a methodology to estimate the true value of water in the Berg River 
water management area in South Africa and evaluated potential impacts of a water market on the 
efficient utilization of water. With a positive mathematical programming model, the author developed a 
spatial equilibrium model to predict the impact of a potential water market. Besides irrigation he also 
includes water for urban uses like households and industries. The true value of water in irrigation was 
found to vary significantly between areas in the basin, with the marginal value of water ranging between 
zero and 20 Rand/m³. These differences indicate that there are significant gains from allocative 
mechanisms possible in these areas.  
Mahan et al. (2002)  determined efficient allocation of surface water resources in Southern 
Alberta, Canada by employing a standard welfare maximizing objective function. They find that intra-
regional transfer from low value uses to high value uses yield substantial benefit increases of around 6% 
compared to the status quo situation. They conclude that efficiency improvements through market 
pricing are likely to be relatively large. 
Rodgers and Zaafrano (2002, 2003) developed an integrated economic-hydrologic water 
resources simulation-optimisation model for the Brantas Basin in East Java, Indonesia. They estimate 
municipal water demands using data from a household survey. However, for the estimation of industrial 
water demands they use average water values and literature-based water demand elasticities and the 
agricultural water demand function is based on different studies of rice yields and FAO yield coefficients. 
                                                   
5 McKinney et al. (1999) provide a good overview of market valuations of water uses applied in different studies. 6 
 
The model is able to simulate new infrastructure allowing the analysis of benefits associated with the 
construction of two new dams. Hence the model does not only emphasise water demands management 
but also considers supply management side.  
Draper et al. (2003) developed an economic-engineering optimisation model for California. They 
maximise the economic value of agricultural and urban water uses representing water demands for the 
year 2020 levels of development. They use state survey data. Limitations of the model include the 
consideration of only two economic sectors and environmental regulation could not be modelled 
accurately.  
Jenkins et al. (2004) developed a large-scale economic-engineering optimization model of 
California’s water supply system. Results suggest significant improvements to system operation and 
water allocations through water transfers and exchanges, conjunctive  use, and various operational 
changes to increase flexibility as well as expanding selected conveyance and storage facilities. The 
authors show that there is great potential to improve the flexibility and economic performance of the 
water system and that both water scarcity and scarcity costs can be considerably reduced. However 
limitations of the model include simplifications of conditions and processes, quality of existing data sets, 
restrictions imposed by the model, and time constraints.  
A holistic model embedding water resources and economic components into a mathematical 
programming model for the Maipo River Basin in Chile was developed by Cai et al. (2001); Cai et al. 
(2006) and Cai (2008), building on the work by Rosegrant et al. (2000). The model optimises water 
allocation by maximising economic profits from water uses in various sectors and confirmed previous 
results where welfare gains could be reached through reallocations to high value uses. In West Africa, 
Ahrends et al. (2008) looked at coupling hydrological-economic modelling for optimizing irrigation in 
West Africa while Bharati et al. (2008) a dynamic coupling of economic and hydrological modelling to 
explore conjunctive irrigation water use in the Volta basin.  
All the above studies conclude that potential gains in the net use value of water could be 
obtained through the hypothetical introduction of water markets which lead to improved water use 
efficiency. 
This study aims to contribute to present literature by using an economic model, based on supply 
figures provided by the hydrological model and primary data on water demands. Unlike most other 
studies, which rely on “literature-based” demand coefficients and other parameters, the study depends 
entirely on own-collected data and the demand coefficients and elasticities are own-estimated, adding 
plausibility to model results. 7 
 
4. Conceptual Framework  
The Optimal Allocation Model (OAM) presents the main constituents for the determination of 
optimal allocation levels modeling different scenarios and simulations. Figure 3 shows the conceptual 
framework of the whole modeling process. Water supply levels as output of the Water Resources Model 
(WRM)
  6 and water demand coefficients
7 for irrigation, mining and domestic sector provide OAM with 
necessary parameters. The WRM is a hydrological model based on the simplification and further 
refinements of the Water Situation Assessment Model (WSAM) (DWAF, 2007) to calculate the water 
resources available for the five tertiary catchments in different sectors. Respective water supply levels 
can be modeled in two different ways. The first model is unconstrained, neglecting basic human and 
ecological needs and thus also neglecting the terms under the NWA (see section 2.1)
8
The second model
. Results identify 
benefit gains resulting from water re-allocation with Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 (see section 5.2 below) 
allowing water re-allocation within and between tertiary catchments respectively.  
9
Demand coefficients for irrigation, mining and domestic sectors were estimated separately, 
employing various methods of valuation. Water for irrigation is valued by simulating a water demand 
function via mathematical programming models. Water price and quantity schedules are simulated with 
an optimization model in GAMS, maximizing farm profits with varying water prices. Demand functions 
are obtained by fitting regression equations and point water price elasticities are calculated. Water 
demand in the mining sector is estimated with econometric methods using time series data. A Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression (SUR) procedure is applied to estimate cost functions for the five mines analyzed 
and water price elasticities and water demand functions are calculated.  Using the estimated cost 
functions, water demands can be derived by varying the water price holding all other inputs and output 
constant. The valuation of domestic water uses allows for a direct estimation of demand function using 
an econometric model (see section 5). 
 analyses water allocation levels under Scenario 1 and 2 if available water is 
reduced to NWA levels. Sustainable water supply levels are results of the WRM, modelled in such a way 
that it gives priority to environmental flows and basic human needs. 
                                                   
6 The WRM was provided by DWAF and updated by the project partners at the University of Witten/Herdecke, 
GmbH, Germany. Further details are available on request from Markus Bombeck (in http://www.uni-wh-utm.de/). 
7 The demand coefficients are the estimated parameters of the water demand equations in each water using sector 
per tertiary catchment. 
8 In the following, this will always be referred to as policy condition “without consideration of the NWA”. 
9 In the following, this will always be referred to as policy condition “with consideration of the NWA”.  8 
 
Figure 3  Conceptual Framework 
 
Source: own presentation 
Through benefit maximization of all water uses in the area, it is possible to define resulting 
benefits and water allocations “without” and “with” consideration of the NWA, allowing water transfer 
between users and regions in the area.  
Various policy simulations give information on possible policy mechanisms to influence optimal 
water allocation levels, according to equity and future population growth.  
The model is easy to implement and flexible to explore potential contemporary scenarios 
proposed by decision makers in South Africa. The principal end users of the model are the planning and 
water services sections at the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) and other stakeholders 
in the water management area. 
The temporal dimension of the model is annual while spatially it is limited to the Middle Olifants 
sub-basin with a further sub-division into five tertiary catchments (see Figure 2). 9 
 
5. Optimal Allocation Model (OAM) 
Typically  prices reflect market scarcity as well as the equilibrium between demand and 
transportation and supply costs (Spulber and Sabbaghi, 1998). If this is not the case, there is market 
imperfection and that impedes the market from adjusting to changes in quantities demanded or to 
changes in costs of supply. Hence, political and institutional mechanisms must be established to ensure 
an efficient water use. Although the NWA provides the constitutional framework for water markets and 
technical water research has received priority in the past, little is known about the economics of water 
use and impacts of alternative water policies (W. L. Nieuwoudt n.a.).  
The following section analyzes gains from water re-allocation among households, irrigation and 
the mining sector in the Middle Olifants, using a non-linear optimization model maximizing total 
benefits of water use. At first, benefits from water-reallocation under current water uses are analyzed 
while in a second step water availability is reduced as per the NWA and new allocation levels are 
estimated. 
5.1  Water Demand Functions 
With a non-linear model, the potential of re-allocation of water entitlements is simulated by 
deterministic mathematical optimization. The model consists of defined inverse water demand functions 
for each water-using sector
10
Table 2  Water Demand Functions
. Table 2 shows the fitted water demand functional forms and their inverse 
representation, which are the essential elements for benefit calculations in the optimal allocation model. 
For the domestic sector, a Stone-Geary (reciprocal) function was fitted; in irrigation a linear logarithmic 
function and in the mining sector a double-log linear function were found to show the best fit. Thereby, 
the various coefficients vary for each tertiary catchment. The coefficients are represented by ‘a’ and ‘b’ 
while the quantity of water demanded is represented by Qw and the price of water by Pw for tertiary 
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10 Detailed information on methodologies used for the determination of water demand functions is available from 
the authors on request. 
11 Coefficients for each tertiary catchment are available from the authors on request. 10 
 
Derived water demand functions in different uses show varying water price elasticities with the 
most inelastic water demand for households. Table 3 shows water price elasticities in alternate uses for 
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For households and irrigation, elasticities are calculated per tertiary catchment whereas in the 
mining sector, water price elasticities  are calculated for each mine. For all sectors, elasticities are 
calculated at average consumption levels and prices. 
Table 3  Own Water Price Elasticities per Sector and Catchment 
Sector  B31  B32  B51  B52  B71 
Domestic  -0.036  -0.036  -0.036  -0.036  -0.036 
Irrigation  -0.198  -0.192  -0.181     
Mining  -0.954      -0.774  -0.897 
-0.872  -0.767 
Source: own results 
At current irrigation water price of 0.07 Rand/m
3, the water price elasticity is -0.20, -0.19 and -
0.18 in catchments B31, B32 and B51 respectively, indicating the weak responsive behavior of farmers. 
However, households react even less to a water price change, which is reflected in the low water price 
elasticity of only -0.04. In the mining sector, water price elasticities are with -0.76 to -0.95, relatively 
higher than in the irrigation and domestic sector, yet inelastic. The low elasticities in irrigation and 
domestic uses can be explained by its characteristic to be an essential good. Households are less 
sensitive to water price changes since they are highly dependent on water for their day to day activities. 
The same is true for irrigation where water is the major input in the production process, while this is 
“relatively“ not true for the mining sector, where substitution possibilities can be found where water is 
one but not the only and major input. 
5.2  Model Structure 
Representative data on water availability is provided by the hydrological model WSAM (DWAF, 
1998). Assumptions underlying the OAM include perfectly competitive markets, deterministic water 
supply and demand, and partial rather than general equilibrium. These assumptions require water to be 
seen as an economic good, where efficiency aspects are decisive for the allocation between high and low 
value uses and if necessary the reallocation to high value uses (Moran and Dann, 2008). The model does 
not consider water quality issues, distribution and transportation costs and hydrological flows, like return 
flows will not explicitly be considered since they are included in the calculations of the WSAM data, 
implying that any changes in off-take will lead to changes in return flows. However, model results show 
that these changes in return flows are marginal and can be neglected. The optimization model is 
                                                   
12 For the translog cost function in the mining sector this formula looks as follows: 
i S








programmed in GAMS, where the different sets and subsets for catchments q and water uses u including 
households, irrigation and mining are formulated. Further sets contain the parameters of the inverse 
water demand functions represented as coefficients a and b. The objective function maximizes total 
benefits TB as the sum of the areas under the inverse demand curves (Mahan et al., 2002, Nieuwoudt et 
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where Fqu (Qw) are the inverse functions for water consumption Qw. Benefits from each water 
usage u in each catchment q can be calculated as the area under the inverse demand functions (see 




equations from Table 2 the choke price at Qmin is calculated and entered in the benefit functions. If the 
integral of the functional form does not converge, it is necessary to add the rectangle from the choke 
price and the corresponding minimum amount demanded to the benefit function. Equations 3, 4 and 5 
respectively show the benefit functions for the domestic, irrigation and mining sector with ‘a’ and ‘b’ as 
the coefficients for the functional forms shown in Table 2. 
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Since water is not available without limit, total water availability per catchment Sq represents 








u = domestic, irrigation and mining sectors 
q = tertiary catchments: B31, B32, B51, B52, B71 
TC= Treatment costs for domestic water uses 
(6) 
 
Distribution losses, which are assumed not to enter into return flows but to be simply sinks, 
account for 25% (Polokwane, 2006) in the domestic and agricultural sectors (Tren & Schur, 2000), while 
they add up to 10% in the mining sector (DWAF, 1998). Results referring to allocation mechanisms are 
presented in section 6.2 while section 6.3 presents policy simulations. 
                                                   
13 The choke price defines the backstop price, at which quantity demanded becomes exactly zero or approximately 
zero.  12 
 
6. Model Results  
In this section, effects of alternative allocation mechanisms based on two different water 
availability levels and sensitivity analyses are presented. The allocation mechanisms to be analyzed 
include intra- and inter-regional trade which will be compared to the status quo situation where current 
water use will be considered and the NWA is not fulfilled.  
Scenario 1: Intra-regional water allocation: Water can only be re-allocated within a tertiary 
catchment but not between tertiary catchments. 
Scenario 2: Inter-regional water allocation: Water can be re-allocated in the whole Middle 
Olifants, that is, between tertiary catchments. 
Besides water quantities, changes in total benefits due to the allocative mechanisms will be 
analyzed. In a second step, simulation scenarios reflecting current policies and future developments are 
developed.  
Simulation 1: Policy-makers may introduce an upper limit to domestic water tariffs to ensure 
basic water quantities for particularly low- income and poor households. This is in-line with the equity 
objective of the NWA. However it should be noted that basic water needs according to the NWA are 
already assured.  
Simulation 2: Policy-makers may set a minimum price for large scale irrigation farmers to 
promote a more efficient water use in irrigation and to cross-subsidize the domestic sector. 
Simulation 3: Population growth and increased urbanization in the year 2050: This simulation 
consists of a prediction of population growth and urbanization rates based on data from Statistical 
Services, South Africa. 
All simulations are modeled at inter- and intra-regional trade water allocation regimes. 
6.1  Current Water Use (2007) 
To be able to analyze the impact of re-allocation and the changes in allocation based on the 
fulfillment of the requirements of the NWA, the existing water use of the year 2007 is modeled. 
Currently, most of the available water (93%) is used by commercial farmers for crop irrigation. Only 
4.7% of the water is consumed by urban and rural households and 2.3% by mines. The fact that current 
water use is highly unsustainable can be seen by comparing current demand to sustainable water supply 
in accordance to NWA (1998) at the catchment level. A negative balance of 171 million m
3/year is 
witnessed the Middle Olifants sub-basin (see Figure 4), implying that groundwater is mined and water is 
used unsustainably. All catchments, but catchment B71, exhibit a negative balance. The situation is most 
severe upstream in catchment B31 in which the gap is almost three times as high as sustainable supply. 
The strong negative balance forms the need for a better –  more sustainable-  water management 
according to the NWA. 13 
 
Figure 4  Water Supply and Demand Gap per Tertiary Catchment (in mil. m
3/year) 
 
Source: own simulations 
6.2  Effects of Water Re-Allocation 
In this section the effects of water re-allocation within and between tertiary catchments will be 
analyzed under two different policy conditions. First, effects purely resulting from water re-allocation 
will be determined using current water demands at status quo situation. Available water amounts do not 
change in this analysis, implying that water is used unsustainably and that the NWA is not considered. 
This makes it possible to single out the benefits from the re-allocation for each sector after having 
estimated efficient water use levels. Model results (as shown in Table 4), support the assumption of 
positive benefit effects from water re-allocation. 
Table 4  Water Use Q (in mil. m
3) and Benefits (in mil. Rand) under Free Market 
Conditions 
Sector 
Status Quo  Without NWA  With NWA 
Current Water 
Demands  Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 1  Scenario 2 
   Q  benefits  Q  benefits  Q  benefits  Q  benefits  Q  benefits 
Irrigation   393.9  2557.1  391.6  2556.8  382.5  2556.2  167.0  2265.7  181.4  2429.1 
Mining   9.8  29.1  13.5  30.9  22.8  32.8  17.9  31.2  1.5  26.9 
Domestic  7.3  99.7  7.3  99.7  7.3  99.7  7.1  99.3  7.2  99.7 
Total  411.0  2685.9  412.4  2687.5  425.2  2688.8  192.0  2396.2  190.1  2555.6 
Source: own simulations 14 
 
The status quo situation shows current water demand levels for each sector at the historical 
level from 2007, reflecting an average year. Corresponding benefits are highest in irrigation representing 
95% of total benefits. Total water use in the Middle Olifants amounts up to around 424 Million m
3 per 
year. Permitting water transfer within tertiary catchments as in Scenario 1, while water availabilities 
stay on status quo levels is leading to small water re-allocations from irrigation to mining, confirming 
the assumption of water flows from low to high value uses under the condition allowing water transfers 
(re-allocation). Water allocations in the mining sector increase by 37% while they decrease by only 1% 
in irrigation, representing a decrease of 2.3 Million m
3 per year. Total benefits increase by 1.6 and 2.9 
Million Rand per year in Scenarios 1 and 2 respectively with the implication that benefits are higher 
when water transfer is allowed in the whole Middle Olifants and not only within tertiary catchments. In 
Scenario 2 water allocations to irrigation further decrease to some extent, while they increase by around 
69% in the mining sector compared to Scenario 1. In the domestic sector, water allocation levels stay 
the same as in the status quo situation, reflecting very low elasticities of households.  
Since current water levels are unsustainable and do not comply with South African policies and 
the NWA, we determine new water allocation levels under decreased water availabilities in a second 
analysis. This allows the consideration of basic human and environmental needs. In Scenario 1, we 
witness an increase of 82% in the mining sector compared to the status quo situation while water 
allocation  in irrigation is reduced by 58%. It can be shown that water re-allocation presents an 
appropriate means to tackle the problem of water scarcity since, although water availabilities are 
reduced by almost 50%, total benefits under Scenario 1 only decrease by around 11% compared to the 
status quo, while it is even less in Scenario 2. Water allocations in Scenario 2 are reduced by 54%, 85% 
and 1.5% respectively in irrigation, mining and domestic compared to the status quo situation. Low 
water allocations to mining can be explained with differences in available water supplies in tertiary 
catchments (see Figure 4) where especially in catchments B52 and B71, gaps between current demand 
and sustainable supply are only slightly negative (B52) or even positive (B71). This leads to lower water 
values resulting in a re-allocation to catchments with highly negative gaps and higher water values. In 
tertiary catchment B31, the water value is very high and water is re-allocated from B71 and B52 to B31. 
This is different to the first situation where the NWA is not considered and water supply levels are much 
higher. Resulting water values are much lower as more water is available than with NWA. Differences in 
total water use levels result from different distribution losses that are accounted for in the model.  
Generally, results show that water markets represent political measures to increase water use 
efficiencies and to re-allocate water to its high value uses. Benefits increase highest in Scenario 2 in 
both situations (‘without’ and ‘with’ NWA). However, it must be noted that high transportation costs 
might accrue, which are not accounted for in the model and which would need further research. 
Including them might lead to different results as inter-regional re-allocation might be very expensive. On 
the other hand, benefits from trade might also be higher if more trading partners were present in the 
area. 
6.3  Policy Simulations 
Given the fact that water is not a purely economic good and that equity aspects play a major 
role in the new South African policy, we run relevant policy simulations and analyze resulting impacts on 
the allocation levels under Scenarios 1 and 2. Further simulations investigate the effects of a population 15 
 
increase in the year 2050 and consequently the effects of increased water demands of the urban 
domestic sector
14
Policy Simulations 1 and 2: Equity Issues 
. 
Until now modeling results only take into account efficiency aspects. However in many cases 
efficiency considerations fail to consider the backward and forward linkages among sectors and other 
non-market uses of water, leading to the incorporation of equity and sustainability issues. This raises the 
question of the allocation of water resources in such a way that the standard of living of most people is 
improved (Juana et al., 2006). Furthermore considering equity issues, accounts for the current South 
African policy. According to the black empowerment policy, the South African government attempts to 
address the past racial inequities by assuring water availability and affordability for all households. 
Hence, no more water (or even less) should be given to large-scale commercial farmers and more shall be 
allocated to the poor population. This simulation tries to address the issue by analyzing different policy 
interventions on the water pricing system.  
In a first simulation, the end user price in the domestic sector will be restricted to a maximum 
level of 4 Rand/m
3. Compared to the current water price of 5.69 Rand/m
3 and compared to water prices 
of up to 8 Rand/m
3 in Scenario 1 and Scenario 2, households would have to pay much less for their 
water
15
Table 5 shows simulation results under Scenarios 1 and 2 and resulting allocation levels and 
benefits for the whole Middle Olifants in each sector. 
. In the second simulation we try to account for the policy of curbing water to irrigation by 
restricting the end user price for large scale irrigation farmers to a minimum level of 2.5 Rand/m
3ceteris 
paribus. Since currently farmers almost pay nothing for water, this price restriction is relatively rigorous; 
nevertheless it would go in line with the policies of the government.  
Table 5  Water Use Q (in mil. m
3) and Benefits (in mil. Rand) under Policy 
Simulations 1 and 2 
  
Sector 
Domestic Water Price ≤ 4 Rand/m
3  Irrigation Water Price ≥ 2.5 Rand/m
3 
Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 1  Scenario 2 
   Q  benefits  Q  benefits  Q  benefits  Q  benefits 
Irrigation  166.7  2263.4  181.1  2428.5  133.4  2212.8  171.1  2405.4 
Mining   17.8  31.2  1.5  26.9  17.9  31.2  13.1  31.8 
Domestic  7.4  99.6  7.4  99.6  7.1  99.3  7.3  99.7 
Total  191.9  2394.2  190.0  2555.0  158.4  2343.3  191.4  2537.0 
Source: own simulations 
                                                   
14 All policy simulations are based on supply levels with consideration of the NWA. 
15 In practical terms, changing price can be implemented at the water source where raw water is extracted and the 
change in raw water tariffs will be translated to the end-user prices. All the simulations on price changes refer to 
changes at the water source and raw water prices. 
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Compared to results in Table 4 (the “with” NWA Scenario 1 and 2 results), water quantities do 
not change remarkably as a result of the domestic water price restriction. Under Scenario 1, domestic 
water allocation increases from 7.1 (see Table 4) to 7.4 million m
3 corresponding to a 4% increase, while 
it increases by only 3% in Scenario 2. Although quantities of water used are higher than without price 
restriction net benefits decrease, as a water price restriction does not lead to efficient water use. Total 
benefits are, with 2394 and 2555 Million Rand only, slightly lower than benefits without price 
restrictions reflecting the low impact of water price restrictions in the domestic sector. 
Looking at the restriction in irrigation, we realize that higher water prices for farmers have a 
high impact on the allocation levels and benefits. Due to the higher water price, farmers are demanding 
around 33 Million m
3 (-20%) less water compared to the unrestricted model under Scenario 1, while 
water use decreases by only 6% under Scenario 2. In Scenario 1, total water use is, with 158.4 Million 
m
3, lower than sustainable availability. Due to the high water price in irrigation, less is demanded and 
more is available for households. However, in tertiary catchments B32 and B51 water is not reallocated 
from irrigation to households instead
16
Results show that policy instruments (altering prices) can be one of the means to influence 
allocation levels under market conditions. By restricting domestic water prices to a maximum of four 
Rands per cubic meter, for example, water is re-allocated from irrigation to households, as more 
domestic households are encouraged to buy more water. However, compared to the high domestic water 
price reduction of around 50%, increase in demand by the domestic households are, with 4 % and 3%, 
relatively low reflecting the low water price elasticity of households (see Table 3). This shows that 
interfering in the water price policy can be one instrument for the government to support households 
and reallocate water from irrigation. Nevertheless, to realize higher reallocation amounts to households, 
further measurements should be applied. Looking at the pricing instrument for farms, it could be shown 
that higher water prices in irrigation lead to highly decreased demands in the sector, but do not support 
reallocations to households but rather to the mining sector. Hence, it does not represent an appropriate 
instrument if households are the ones to be favored. 
, since it would not be efficient and water is therefore left unused. 
In Scenario 2 all water available is used, and is reallocated to the mining sector in catchments B52 and 
B71. The resulting high increase of water use in the mining sector and the corresponding low increase in 
net benefits, reflects the inefficient water re-allocation due to price restrictions in irrigation. Even in the 
domestic sector water allocation increased slightly to 7.4 million m
3. Total benefits in the Middle Olifants 
decrease by around 2% and 1% in Scenarios 1 and 2 respectively compared to the analysis considering 
the NWA without price restrictions. 
Policy Simulation 3: Population Increase 
This scenario is based on population growth rates and urbanization until the year 2050. 
According to the higher population figures, the amount of water assigned to the ‘Human Reserve’ 
increases. As it is prioritized by the NWA, this decreases the amount of water to be freely allocated 
among the sectors. Table 6 presents the new allocation figures per sector. All sectors get less water in 
2050 than in 2007. The amount of water allocated to urban households is least reduced with only 0.03% 
and 0.05% reduction in Scenario 1 and 2 (2050) respectively compared to the allocation in 2007 (see 
Table 4). However, as the number of urban households increases due to population growth and 
urbanization, less water per person is available. While in 2007 every person has 30.8m
3/year (Scenario 1) 
                                                   
16 In catchments B32 and B51 there are no mining activities.  17 
 
or 31m
3/year (Scenario 2) of water available in urban areas, these numbers decline until 2050 to 
22.9m
3/year (Scenario 1 2050) and 23m
3/year (Scenario 2 2050).  
As water levels allocated to urban households hardly decrease, water increase in the ‘Human 
Reserve’ comes at the expense of the irrigation and the mining sector. The amount of water allocated to 
both sectors decreases by 1.1% and 7.7% respectively compared to the corresponding amounts in 2007 
in scenario 1. Scenario 2 leads to savings from irrigation of 1.7% and of 4% from the mining sector. 
Accordingly, changes in benefits are marginal with less than 1% decreases in the sectors. Prices changes 
are also very low. 
Table 6  Water Use Q (in mil. m
3) and Benefits (in mil. Rand) under Policy 
Simulation 3 
Sector 
Scenario 1 (2050) 
 
Scenario 2 (2050) 
 
   Q  benefits  Q  benefits 
Irrigation  165.1  2259.6  178.3  2422.4 
Mining  16.5  30.9  1.4  26.8 
Urban households  7.1  99.3  7.2  99.7 
Total  188.7  2389.8  186.9  2548.8 
Source: own simulations 18 
 
7. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
If not properly allocated, the sustainably available water resources are insufficient to meet the 
economic and socio-political objectives of the country. The development of new water sources in the 
Middle Olifants is not possible. Thus, using water efficiently and allocating it in such a way that it meets 
the economic and sociopolitical objectives of the country is crucial for the future sustainable water 
availability. Due to this reason, the paper emphasizes on how to optimally allocate the limited available 
water to meet the socio-economic objectives.  
The “without NWA” results of the study suggest that in order to maximize the benefits from 
water use and thus meet the socio-economic objectives, water should be transferred from irrigation to 
mining, while domestic water use should relatively stay unchanged (with negligible transfer to mining). 
This is a reflection of the growing importance of the mining sector and its highest economic return from 
water. The “with NWA” result suggests an overall reduction of water for all with a higher amount (in 
Volume) for irrigation and again domestic water use will remain relatively stable. From DWAF’s point of 
view, in order to redress the historically disadvantaged individuals, water should be taken away from 
irrigation farmers (mostly rich and white) to the domestic needy (mostly black and poor in the rural 
areas). Thus the model results show that the government policy of capping water for irrigation does not 
only meet the socio-political objective but has economic rationale especially when transferred to mining. 
We agree with the planned cut of water for irrigation but we challenge the government’s plan to direct 
the water transfer to domestic water users as this may meet the equity objective but not economic 
objectives. We also confirm that with growing water scarcity, water use becomes more efficient as 
evidenced by the lower (5-11%) reduction in the total benefits from water compared to the higher 
(about 50%) water reduction to meet the NWA requirements. Both intra-and inter-regional allocation 
results provide evidence for benefits of water re-allocations. Assuming that intra-regional allocation 
involves less transaction cost than the inter-regional allocation and owing to lower distances and 
resulting lower transportation costs in the short run, the intra-regional allocation is more beneficial. 
However, the intra-regional allocation involves some water loss in B71 as the sustainable supply is more 
than what is actually used. Therefore, intra-regional allocation will be more effective in future when the 
government will make use of this water once the planned several mining companies in B71 are in place 
(Conradie, 2007). 
All scenario results, without exception, confirm the fact that water transfer from irrigation to 
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